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Abstract
This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and
unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition based on data from
DHS surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational
differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility
tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in more and less developed countries
with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial
when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This finding im-
plies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of
overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be
a cause of stalling fertility.
Many less developed countries have experienced large fertility declines in recent
decades. The average total fertility rate (TFR) for the developing world in 1995–2000 is
estimated at 3.1 births per woman, half the level observed in the 1950s (United Nations
2001). Fertility differences among countries are now larger than ever because transi-
tions to replacement fertility have not yet started in some countries (e.g., in parts of West
Africa) and have already been completed in others (e.g., in the economically most ad-
vanced countries of Southeast Asia). As a result, the observed TFRs of developing coun-
tries in 1995–2000 range from a high of 8 in Niger to a low of 1.2 in Macao. Past expe-
rience suggests that once fertility declines are underway they tend to continue, and the
United Nations therefore projects that most countries will complete their fertility transi-
tions before 2050.
Country-level fertility statistics conceal considerable differences in reproductive
behavior among socioeconomic groups within countries. Fertility is usually higher in
rural than in urban areas, higher among uneducated women than among their better-
educated counterparts, and higher in households with low incomes (United Nations 1987;
Merrick 2001). Educational differentials are among the best-established and most widely
studied socioeconomic differentials (Cochrane 1979; Caldwell 1982; United Nations
1987, 1995; Cleland and Rodríguez 1988; Jejeebhoy 1995; Jeffery and Basu 1996; Na-
tional Research Council 1999). Much of the empirical evidence on socioeconomic dif-
ferentials in the developing world is based on survey data collected in programs such as
the World Fertility Survey (WFS) in the 1970s and early 1980s and the Demographic
and Health Surveys (DHS) since the mid-1980s. These surveys provide extensive docu-
mentation of fertility differentials for countries in the early and mid-transitional stages,
but they provide little information about how the pattern of differentials evolves toward
the end of the transition. The conventional wisdom about the importance of education
levels leads one to expect that educational differences in fertility will remain at the end
of the transition. Some analysts, however (e.g., Jeffery and Basu 1996; Lutz and Goujon
2001; Cleland 2002), suggest that the link between schooling and fertility is a transient
phenomenon that could disappear when countries approach replacement-level fertility.
This study has three objectives. The first is to summarize the pattern of fertility
differentials by level of education at various stages of the transition based on data from
4DHS surveys in 57 less developed countries. Next, the analysis of differentials in over-
all fertility is extended to differentials in the wanted and unwanted components of fertil-
ity. The final objective is to assess evidence on fertility differentials and on the wanted
status of births at the end of the transition. The expectation is that the detailed descrip-
tion of the various dimensions of the fertility transition will be helpful in explaining the
nature of the transition, in projecting future trends, and in identifying population policy
options.
DATA
The primary sources of data for this study are DHS surveys conducted in 57 less
developed countries since 1985. In a number of countries more than one DHS survey is
available. All surveys with nationally representative samples were included (except former
Soviet republics, Pakistan, 1990–91, India, 1998–98, and Sri Lanka, 1987—for which
estimates of wanted and unwanted fertility for standard categories of education level
were not available). The surveys are as follows:
Asia: Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Viet-
nam.
Latin America: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago.
Near East/North Africa: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Ni-
geria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
From each survey a custom tabulation with estimates of the TFR, the wanted
TFR, and the unwanted TFR by level of education was obtained with the STAT compiler
program available at the DHS web site www.measuredhs.com. This source provides
fertility data for three education categories—no schooling, primary (complete and in-
complete), and secondary or higher— using country-specific definitions of primary and
secondary schooling. Because these education categories are broad, the average years of
schooling within each level varies among countries and over time. For example, women
5with secondary-plus education can be expected to have, on average, more schooling at
the end of the fertility transition than at the beginning.
The large volume of information in these tabulations is condensed in the tables
and figures of this study by grouping countries by their transition stage. As summarized
in Table 1, seven transition stages are defined according to the level of TFR observed at
the time of the survey. Countries with multiple surveys contribute only one observation
per stage. Although there are no post-transitional countries, at least four country esti-
mates are available for each of the other transition stages, and for the mid-transition
stage 21 country estimates are available (see last column in Table 1).
FERTILITY BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION
Although the relationship between fertility and level of education varies among
countries and is not always linear or monotonic, women with more than primary educa-
tion have substantially lower fertility than women with no education in virtually all
DHS and WFS surveys (Jejeebhoy 1995; Rutstein, forthcoming). This relationship is in
part attributable to other factors such as family income, rural–urban residence, and
husband’s education. After controlling for such factors in multivariate analyses, the ef-
fect of wife’s education remains statistically significant and it is more powerful than the
effect of husband’s education or the family’s economic status (Jejeebhoy 1995).
The well-established cross-sectional relationship between women’s education and
fertility in mid-transitional countries is consistent with different perspectives regarding
the permanence of educational differentials at the end of the transition. This issue is
Table 1 Ranges of total fertility rate assigned to transition stages
Transition stage TFR range Number of DHS surveys
Pre 7+ 4
Early  6 to 6.9 19
Early-mid  5 to 5.9 16
Mid  4 to 4.9 21
Mid-late  3 to 3.9 12
Late  2.1 to 2.9 7
Post 0 to 2.0 0
Note: Countries with multiple surveys contribute only one observation per stage.
6illustrated in Figure 1, which plots two alternative model patterns for the transition of
fertility by level of education. In Model A, called the “leader–follower” model, the de-
cline from high to low fertility follows the same trajectory over time in each education
group, with the most educated women making this transition earlier than the least edu-
Figure 1 Model patterns for fertility transition by level of education
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7cated. The less educated follow the pattern of the more educated with a lag. Levels of
fertility at the beginning and end of the transition are the same in all education groups,
but during the transition fertility is inversely associated with level of education. In this
model educational differentials are considered a temporary phenomenon.
An alternative pattern for the evolution of educational differentials, plotted as
Model B, may be called the “permanent-difference” model. In this pattern differences
exist at all stages of the transition, not just in middle stages.
The two models in Figure 1 also present the average TFR for the entire population.
This is a weighted average of the education-specific TFRs, with the weights given by the
size of each education group. In the earliest transition phase most women have no educa-
tion. As a result, the lower fertility among the small group of women with primary or
secondary-plus education has little effect on the overall TFR, which is close to the TFR of
the group with no education. At the end of the transition a majority of women typically
have more than primary education, and the average TFR then approaches the TFR of the
highest education group. In the leader–follower model the average TFR follows roughly
the same time pattern as in each individual group. In contrast, in the permanent-differ-
ence model the average TFR drops at a faster pace than the TFR of any subgroup.
The differences between these two models are particularly significant in the last
stages of the transition, which are the focus of this study. According to the leader–fol-
lower model the fertility of all education groups converges to the same value and, as a
result, the distribution of the population by level of education has no direct effect on
overall fertility. In contrast, the permanent-difference model assumes that fertility dif-
ferentials remain at the end of the transition and the population’s educational composi-
tion then clearly affects the average TFR of a population. Other things being equal,
average fertility in a population with little schooling will be higher than in a population
in which schooling is common. Even in the permanent-difference model, however, much
of the overall decline in fertility is attributable to declines of fertility within each educa-
tion group rather than to an upward shift in the distribution of levels of schooling in the
population.
To determine which model is more appropriate for the contemporary developing
world the empirical evidence is summarized next.
8Trends in educational differentials
 Figure 2 presents the TFR by level of education for six illustrative countries. For
each of these countries at least three observations from DHS surveys are available be-
Figure 2 Trends in total fertility rate by level of education
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9tween 1985 and 2000. In addition, an estimate from a WFS survey in the 1970s is in-
cluded to obtain a more complete picture of the fertility trend between the 1970s and the
late 1990s. All six countries experienced substantial fertility declines from levels around
7 births per woman in the early 1960s (United Nations 2001). Kenya dropped to 4.7
births per woman in 1998, Senegal to 5.7 in 1997, Bangladesh to 3.3 in 1999, Egypt to
3.5 in 2000, Colombia to 2.6 in 2000, and the Dominican Republic to 3.2 in 1996.
As shown in Figure 2, these declines in overall fertility were accompanied by
declines in the fertility of all education groups. The TFR of women with secondary-plus
education is lower than that of women with no education in all six countries and at all
observed points in time. Over time the difference between the highest and lowest educa-
tion groups has widened slightly in Kenya, Senegal, and Bangladesh, the three countries
that were pretransitional at the time of the WFS in the 1970s. In the remaining three
countries, the gap between the highest and lowest education levels narrowed over time
as the TFR of the lowest education group dropped more rapidly than the TFR of the
highest education group. However, the TFR gap between women with no schooling and
women with secondary-plus education remains substantial at the latest observation point
in the late 1990s. Even in Colombia, where the overall TFR reached 2.6 in 2000, this
gap remains at 1.8 births per woman.
Cross-sectional patterns
Estimates of the TFR by level of education from surveys in 57 less developed
countries are summarized in Figure 3 (for further details see the Appendix table). This
figure provides averages for countries at each transition stage as described in Table 1. As
expected, fertility is inversely related to level of education in each phase. In addition, for
each education group the average TFR is higher in pretransitional than in late transitional
countries: 7.7 vs. 4.0 for women with no schooling, 6.4 vs. 3.1 for women with primary
education, and 4.3 vs. 2.1 for women with secondary-plus education. The absolute differ-
ence between the highest and lowest education groups narrows modestly with transition
stage, but even for countries with overall TFRs between 2 and 3, the differential remains
a very substantial 1.9 births per woman (4.0 minus 2.1). However, both the relative dif-
ference between education groups and the ratio of the TFRs of the highest to the lowest
education group are substantially higher in the late than in the earliest transitional stages.
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The empirical results summarized in Figures 2 and 3 are consistent with the find-
ings from previous studies that have documented fertility differentials in the developing
world. An extensive but inconclusive literature has examined possible causes of the
education–fertility link. In attempting to unravel causal pathways it has proven useful to
distinguish between the proximate determinants of fertility, such as marriage and the
practice of contraception, and the more distant socioeconomic determinants. The evi-
dence on the former is fairly clear: the higher the level of schooling, the later the age at
marriage and the higher the level of preference implementation through contraceptive
use. On the other hand, there is no agreement on the socioeconomic factors responsible
for the inverse relationship between education and fertility. A variety of plausible expla-
nations have been proposed, including the effect of schooling on women’s autonomy,
the opportunity costs of childbearing, and exposure to Western values (Cochrane 1979;
Caldwell 1982; United Nations 1987, 1995; Cleland and Rodríguez 1988; Jejeebhoy
1995; Jeffery and Basu 1996; National Research Council 1999). A review of this litera-
Figure 3 Total fertility rate by level of education: Averages for 57 countries in
different transition stages
Source: DHS data files.
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ture by Cleland (2002) suggests that, given the complexity of these issues, researchers
may never reach consensus.
The role of preferences and unwanted childbearing is examined next to shed fur-
ther light on the reasons why educational differentials exist throughout the fertility tran-
sition.
WANTED AND UNWANTED FERTILITY
Following standard DHS practice, the wanted TFR (WTFR) is calculated in the
same manner as the conventional TFR, except that births are excluded from the calcula-
tion if they occur after the mother has reached her desired family size (Bankole and
Westoff 1995). The unwanted TFR (UNWTFR) is simply the difference between the
overall and wanted TFR.
Trends
Figure 4 plots trends in the TFR and its wanted and unwanted components for the
same six countries that were included in Figure 2. The wanted TFR runs broadly parallel
to the TFR, but is of course lower than the overall level. The data for UNWTFR show no
clear trend over time, although they suggest a weak inverted U-shape over the course of
the fertility transition. This is clearest in Kenya, where the UNWTFR initially rose from
0.3 to 2.2 between 1978 and 1989 but subsequently declined to 1.2 in 1998. A similar
but less perceptible pattern is evident in Bangladesh and Egypt. The rise in unwanted
fertility in Senegal is consistent with such a pattern because this country is still in the
early stages of the transition. In Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Egypt un-
wanted fertility declined modestly over time as these countries approached the later
phases of the transition, but in these three countries the early phases of the transitions
were not observed because they occurred before the 1970s.
Cross-sectional patterns
Figure 5 plots averages for the overall TFR and its wanted and unwanted compo-
nents by transition stage, summarizing observations from surveys in 57 countries as
discussed earlier. The pattern in the unwanted TFR evident in this figure is consistent
12
Figure 4 Trends in total fertility rate and its wanted and unwanted components
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with a weak inverted U-shape suggested by the longitudinal data. For countries in the
pretransitional phase the UNWTFR averages 0.9 births per woman, but this average is
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higher (1.1 births per woman) in mid-transitional countries and lower (0.6 births per
woman) in late transitional countries. These levels imply a more than doubling of the
proportion of fertility that is unwanted, from 12 percent (0.90/7.35) early in the transi-
tion to 25 percent (0.63/2.54) late in the transition.
Explanation and further discussion of this pattern in unwanted fertility are pro-
vided by Bongaarts (1997). In short, unwanted fertility is low at the beginning of the
transition because fertility preferences are high. Consequently, women at that stage need
most of their reproductive lives after marriage to reach the large number of children they
wish to have. In such settings, women who do reach their desired family size have little
reproductive time left during which unwanted births can occur. Unwanted fertility is
low early in the transition because there is limited exposure to the risk of unwanted
childbearing. However, this exposure rises once desired family size declines as the tran-
sition gets underway. Unwanted fertility then usually rises because a significant propor-
tion of women who want no more children do not practice effective contraception. Fi-
Figure 5 Total fertility rate and its wanted and unwanted components: Averages for
57 countries in different transition stages
Source: DHS data files.
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nally, in the latest stages of the transition the implementation of preferences (through
the use of effective contraception) rises to sufficiently high levels so that unwanted
fertility declines again. At the end of the transition women typically want two children
on average. This implies that wanted childbearing can be completed in a few years and
most women then face many years of marriage during which they are exposed to the risk
of unwanted childbearing. Even if the large majority of these women use highly effec-
tive contraception, the duration of exposure is sufficiently long so that in most countries
unwanted fertility remains substantial. This issue is discussed further in a later section
of this study.
DIFFERENTIALS IN WANTED AND UNWANTED FERTILITY
The preceding sections examined educational differences in fertility and the wanted
and unwanted components of overall fertility. The next step is to consider separately the
educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility.
Trends
Figure 6 plots trends in TFR, WTFR, and UNWTFR by level of education for the
same six countries examined earlier. Only DHS observations are included because such
detailed data have not been published for the WFS. The results in Figure 6 suggest two
conclusions that were not evident in the earlier figures. First, both the wanted and un-
wanted components of fertility are inversely associated with level of education. That is,
in all cases, women with secondary-plus education have lower wanted and unwanted
fertility than women with primary education. Women with primary education in turn
frequently have lower wanted and unwanted fertility than their counterparts with no
schooling. Two exceptions to this generalization occur in Kenya and Senegal, where
unwanted TFR among women with primary education is higher than among women
with no education. This finding is probably attributable to the high wanted fertility among
women with no schooling in these countries, who, as a consequence, have little expo-
sure to the risk of unwanted childbearing. Second, educational differentials in wanted
and unwanted fertility appear to vary by stage of the transition. In Colombia and the
Dominican Republic, two countries that are approaching the end of their transitions,
15
Figure 6 Trends in total fertility rate and wanted total fertility rate by level of
education
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educational differentials in wanted fertility are small and differentials in unwanted fer-
tility are large. The reverse is the case in Senegal and Kenya, which are still in the early
transition stages.
Cross-sectional patterns
These conclusions are consistent with the results in Figure 7, which presents the
cross-sectional summary of this topic based on data from DHS surveys in 57 countries.
In the pretransitional countries differentials in wanted fertility are large: the WTFR of
women with no schooling exceeds that of the most educated by 3.2 births per woman
(6.9 minus 3.7). Countries in the later stages have smaller differences in wanted fertility,
and in the late stage the difference between women with no schooling and women with
secondary-plus education is just 1.0 birth per woman (2.7 minus 1.7).
The cross-sectional results for unwanted fertility show a quite different pattern.
In the earliest stage there is little difference by level of education, and the UNWTFR
averages about 0.8 birth per woman for each group. In countries in the latest stages the
Figure 7 Average wanted and unwanted total fertility rate by level of education and
transition stage
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unwanted TFR is generally higher, reaching 1.5 births per woman among women with
no schooling. In contrast, the unwanted TFR of women with secondary-plus education
averages just 0.4 births per woman in late transitional countries. As a result, in the later
transitional stages unwanted childbearing is much more common among uneducated
women than among women with secondary-plus education.
The main finding emerging from this analysis is that the role of the wanted and
unwanted components of educational fertility differences varies by stage of the transi-
tion. Early in the transition fertility differences are almost entirely attributable to differ-
ences in wanted fertility, and differences in unwanted fertility are relatively small. In
late transitional countries differences in unwanted fertility are important and are compa-
rable in magnitude to differences in wanted fertility.
Although a full explanation of these patterns is not attempted here, it is likely that
the convergence of wanted fertility is in part attributable to diffusion and social interac-
tion processes. Diffusion refers to the spread of information, ideas, and behaviors among
individuals, communities, and countries; social interaction refers to the fact that repro-
ductive attitudes and behaviors of individuals can be influenced by the attitudes and
behaviors of others. An extensive literature exists on this subject (Knodel and van de
Walle 1979; Watkins 1986; Cleland and Wilson 1987; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996;
Montgomery and Casterline 1996; Casterline 2001; Cleland 2001; Kohler 2001; Na-
tional Research Council 2001; Bongaarts 2002). Countries in the later stages of the
fertility transition are generally more developed than those in the earlier stages. As a
result, opportunities for social interaction increase—for example, through the influence
of the media, mass schooling, and migration, all of which facilitate the spread of ideas
and information about the desirability of limiting family size.
One would expect that these same processes also facilitate the spread of ideas and
information about methods of birth control. This is no doubt the case, but other forces at
work nevertheless produce a widening of educational differentials in unwanted fertility.
As already noted, limited exposure to the risk of unwanted pregnancy keeps unwanted
childbearing at low levels early in the transition. As the transition proceeds, the duration
of exposure to the risk of unwanted pregnancy rises but this trend is offset by the rising
use of birth control. If birth control is highly effective, unwanted fertility can decline, as
18
observed among women with secondary-plus education. However, if birth control is
only moderately effective then unwanted fertility will increase with the rise in exposure,
as observed among women with no schooling. (Despite this rise, unwanted fertility among
women with no schooling is still much lower than it would have been in the absence of
birth control.) The reasons why highly educated women are better able to implement
their fertility preferences presumably include their higher degree of autonomy in repro-
ductive decisionmaking, better access to and better information about contraception, a
greater willingness to tolerate various side effects and inconveniences associated with
the use of methods of contraception, and greater cooperation from husbands.
THE END OF THE FERTILITY TRANSITION
The preceding analysis focused on fertility differentials in countries at all stages
of the fertility transition except the last one. The final objective is to infer from available
evidence the fertility differentials and levels of wanted and unwanted childbearing that
are likely to be observed at the end of the transition. Post-transitional fertility will no
doubt vary among countries, but the transition endpoint is often assumed to be replace-
ment fertility with a TFR of 2.1 births per woman. This assumption, for example, is
incorporated in the population projections made by the United Nations (2001).
Fertility differentials
Estimates of TFR by level of education for developed and developing countries
with low fertility are available from two survey programs:
Demographic and Health Surveys. Although none of the developing countries
with DHS surveys has reached a TFR of 2.1, fertility in three countries is close to the
replacement level: Brazil (2.5), Thailand (2.3), and Vietnam (2.2). Their experience is
therefore clearly relevant. Figure 8 plots estimates of differentials in fertility and its
wanted and unwanted components. These patterns are consistent with those observed
above in countries in mid and late transitional stages. In particular, the gaps between the
highest and lowest educational levels are large, ranging from 2.8 births per woman (4.9
minus 2.1) in Brazil to 1.4 (3.5 minus 2.1) in Vietnam.
19
Figure 8 Total fertility rate and its wanted and unwanted components by level of
education, Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam
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Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) in Europe, sponsored by the UN Economic
Commission for Europe. Table 2 presents the average number of children ever born to
women at the end of their childbearing years (aged 45–49) by level of education for ten
countries for which this information has been published. Because the FFS does not use
the no schooling/primary/secondary-plus categories, these results are not directly com-
parable to those of the DHS. In the FFS women with a “low” level of education have no,
primary, or early secondary education; “medium” refers to women with completed sec-
ondary or up to four years of postsecondary education; and “high” refers to women with
a university degree or equivalent. In these ten European countries women with low
education on average have 0.6 births more than women with high education (2.27 minus
1.68). Estimates are not available for the small proportion of women with no schooling,
but their fertility could well be significantly higher than the average of the “low” group,
which includes women with education up to the early secondary level.
In addition two country studies provide relevant estimates. In Taiwan, with an
overall TFR of 1.7 in 1991, fertility estimates by level of education range from 3.6 births
per woman for primary school graduates to 1.2 for college graduates (Freedman et al.
Table 2 Average number of children ever born to women aged 45–49 in selected
European countries
Education level (ISCED)
Low (0–2) Medium (3–4) High (4–6)
Bulgaria 2.1 1.8 1.6
Finland 2.4 1.9 1.6
France 2.4 2.0 1.6
Greece 2.3 1.9 2.1
Italy 2.3 1.8 1.5
Lithuania 1.9 1.9 1.8
Poland 2.5 2.1 1.6
Portugal 2.2 1.5 1.7
Spain 2.6 2.1 1.9
Switzerland 1.9 1.7 1.4
Average 2.27 1.86 1.68
Note: ISCED refers to the International Standard for Classification of Education. See text for further details.
Source: UN Economic Commission for Europe, Fertility and Family Surveys in Countries of the ECE Region.
New York and Geneva: Standard Country Reports for: Bulgaria 2001; Finland 1998; France 1998; Greece 2002;
Italy 2000; Lithuania 2000; Poland 1997; Portugal 2000; Spain 1999; Switzerland 1999.
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1994). The United States has been post-transitional for a long time, but fertility differen-
tials remain. In 1994, the TFR of women with 0 to 8 years of education was 2.7 while
women with 16-plus years had a TFR of 1.7 (Mathews and Ventura 1997).
Although comparisons of the data from these various sources is complicated by
the use of different categories for level of education, the results show a consistent and
substantial inverse association between fertility and level of education. Educational dif-
ferentials in fertility clearly remain substantial in post-transitional societies, and the
TFR of women without schooling could well remain above 3.
Wanted status of births
The limited evidence on preferences from Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam sug-
gests that both wanted and unwanted fertility are inversely related to level of education
and that levels of unwanted fertility remain substantial at the end of the transition (see
Figure 8). The exception to this pattern is the level of unwanted fertility among women
with no schooling in Vietnam, which is lower than among women with primary school-
ing. The reason for this is not clear, but is perhaps related to the one-or-two-child policy
of the Vietnamese government (Goodkind 1995). The unwanted TFR equals 0.7 in Bra-
zil and 0.4 in Thailand and Vietnam, representing, respectively, 28, 18, and 17 percent
of overall fertility. As noted, this finding is not surprising, in view of the difficulties
women often encounter in preventing unplanned pregnancy. Unwanted pregnancies are
absent only in societies in which all women who want no more children use 100 percent
effective contraception. In practice, not all women in post-transitional societies who
want no more children practice contraception and those who do often rely on methods
that are not 100 percent effective. As a consequence, unwanted pregnancies remain fairly
common even when overall fertility is low. In countries in which women have access to
induced abortion, some of these pregnancies will be ended.
Implications
The leader–follower model for the pattern of fertility differentials at different
transition stages described at the beginning of this study does not appear to be the best
way to describe the transition. Contrary to the model’s assumption, educational differ-
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entials in fertility remain substantial in the late and post-transitional stages. The alterna-
tive permanent-difference model is also not entirely accurate because differentials are
typically smaller at the end of the transition than in mid-transitional countries. On bal-
ance, the empirical evidence is more consistent with the permanent-difference than with
the leader–follower model.
An important implication of this conclusion is that women’s educational compo-
sition can play a key role in shaping levels and trends in fertility at the end of the transi-
tion. In most late- and post-transitional countries more than 90 percent of women have
at least some primary education. As a result, the fact that the TFR of a small group of
women with no schooling remains at 3 or higher has little impact on overall fertility in
these countries. However, the relatively high fertility of women with no schooling can
have a significant impact in countries where a substantial proportion of married women
have little or no schooling. For example, the proportion of married women with no
schooling is 42 percent in Egypt and 45 percent in Bangladesh and the TFR of this group
of women exceeds 4. Fertility has dropped rapidly in these two countries between the
1960s and early 1990s, but during the 1990s the fertility transitions appear to have stalled
at a TFR slightly above 3 (see Figure 4). The persistence of fertility differentials to-
gether with low levels of schooling among married women is a likely contributing fac-
tor to this stalling. In contrast, in the three DHS countries with TFRs at 2.5 or lower
(Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam) the proportion with no education is less than 10 percent.
CONCLUSION
The fertility declines now underway in many less developed countries are almost
invariably associated with substantial fertility differences among socioeconomic sub-
groups. Women with primary education tend to have higher fertility than women with
secondary-plus education, and women with no schooling tend to have higher fertility
than women with primary education. The preceding analysis indicates that these educa-
tional differentials are slightly larger in countries in the earlier than in the later stages of
the transition. Although the evidence is not entirely conclusive, educational differentials
are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their
23
transitions. The implication of this finding is that the educational composition of the
population remains a key determinant of a country’s overall level of fertility. Because
the fertility of women with no schooling is expected to remain well above 2 births per
woman at the end of the transition, it follows that countries with large proportions of
women with no schooling are unlikely to see rapid declines to replacement fertility, and
some may stall above replacement.
Fertility differences among education groups were found to be attributable to
differences in both wanted and unwanted fertility. Higher levels of education are usually
associated with lower levels of wanted and unwanted fertility, but this pattern varies by
transition stage. On average, differences in wanted fertility are larger at early stages of
the transition. In contrast, differences in unwanted fertility are typically smaller at early
stages of the transition. These complex patterns can be explained by a combination of
differences between education groups in the exposure to the risk of unintended preg-
nancy and differences in the ability to implement reproductive preferences.
Nearly all early- and mid-transitional countries will require substantial declines
in both wanted and unwanted fertility in order to reach replacement fertility. Knowledge
of these fertility components is useful to policymakers seeking to accelerate fertility
transitions. For example, if unwanted fertility is particularly high, a first step should be
to improve family planning services so that couples have access to the means to imple-
ment their preferences. The low levels of unwanted fertility in Indonesia, Thailand, and
Vietnam are no doubt attributable in part to strong family planning programs operating
in these countries. If unwanted fertility is especially high among the uneducated (e.g., in
a number of Latin American countries), then the focus of efforts to improve services
should be on this group. In countries where wanted fertility is high, other factors need to
be encouraged. Although there is still disagreement about the socioeconomic causes of
fertility decline, investments in human capital such as education and lower mortality are
considered particularly important (Caldwell 1982; Sen 1999). Regardless of whether
declines in wanted or unwanted fertility are sought, such changes are facilitated by im-
provements in levels of schooling.
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